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Throughout the past thirty years, the Fordham Urban Law Jour-
nal has progressively published numerous articles concerning a
broad range of topics, including discussions of decisions affecting
litigation practice and municipal liability.1 This Article will discuss
and summarize the recent significant decisions by the New York
State Court of Appeals and other appellate courts that will alter or
greatly impact future tort litigation, especially with regard to mu-
nicipal liability.
Although the State of New York has waived its sovereign immu-
nity, the waiver was not absolute. The waiver of sovereign immu-
nity is specifically conditioned upon compliance with the
requirements that accompany the waiver and the standards estab-
lished by the Court of Claims Act.2 In Alston v. State of New
York,3 the Court of Appeals stressed the potential rigidity of the
time limitations for filing a claim against the State, pursuant to the
Court of Claims Act.4
On several recent occasions, the Court of Appeals thoroughly
discussed the "serious injury" standard conditioned within New
* Assistant Attorney General in the Suffolk Regional Office assigned to the liti-
gation of civil claims against the State of New York. Mr. Shields received the 2002
"Louis J. Lefkowitz Memorial Award" from the Office of the Attorney General for
dedication, professionalism, and outstanding service. He was previously an Assistant
Town Attorney with the Town of Southampton and trial attorney with the Legal Aid
Society of Suffolk County. He has published over thirty legal articles. He attended
Hamilton College and obtained his Juris Doctorate and Masters in Business Adminis-
tration from Fordham University. Any opinions expressed in the Article are exclu-
sively those of the Author and not the Office of the Attorney General.
1. See Constantine N. Katsoris, The Fordham Urban Law Journal: A New Millen-
nium, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 797 (2003); Constantine N. Katsoris, The Fordham Ur-
ban Law Journal: Twenty Years of Progress, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 915 (1992).
2. N.Y. CT. CL. ACT §§ 1 et seq. (Consol. 2003).
3. 762 N.E.2d 923 (N.Y. 2001).
4. Id. at 926.
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York Insurance Law. Accident victims must present admissible
evidence that contains verified, quantitative, and objective medical
results in order to successfully establish a prima facie case that a
plaintiff sustained a "serious injury," as defined by the State Insur-
ance Law.
6
In more than one decision, the court took the opportunity to
clarify the rule of apportionment contained within Article 16 of the
Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR").7 Article 16 permits a de-
fendant to seek apportionment of its liability with another
tortfeasor. Additionally, apportionment of damages for personal
injuries is permissible between a negligent landlord or owner and a
non-party assailant in cases involving negligent security.8
Twice this past year, the court addressed the standard of care
required for the operation of hazard and emergency vehicles. 9 The
court confirmed that "recklessness" was the proper standard of
care to apply to "hazard" vehicles."' At the same time, the court
rejected the argument that such vehicles must be located in a desig-
nated "work area" in order to qualify for the hazard vehicle
exemption."I
In Criscione v. City of New York, 2 the Court of Appeals clarified
that a "police officer who was driving a patrol car in response to a
[non-emergency] dispatch call was engaged in the 'emergency op-
eration' of a vehicle as defined in New York State Vehicle and Traf-
fic Law ("VTL") [section] 114-b. ' 13 "Consequently, [the officer's]
actions should not be measured by ordinary negligence standards,
but rather by the 'reckless disregard' standard of [VTL] section
1104(e).' 14
The appellate courts further discussed the requisite standard re-
quired to establish municipal liability for the negligent perform-
ance of a governmental function. 15 Absent a special relationship,
5. See, e.g., Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 1197, 1199-1200
(N.Y. 2002); Oberly v. Bangs Ambulance, 751 N.E.2d 457, 460 (N.Y. 2001); Grossman
v. Wright, 707 N.Y.S.2d 233, 236-37 (App. Div. 2000).
6. N.Y. INS. LAw § 5102(d) (Consol. 2003).
7. See, e.g., Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 749 N.E.2d 184, 184-86 (N.Y. 2001);
Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 749 N.E.2d 178, 181-83 (N.Y. 2001).
8. See, e.g., Chianese v. Meier, 774 N.E.2d 722, 725-26 (N.Y. 2002).
9. See, e.g., Riley v. County of Broome, 742 N.E.2d 98, 103-05 (N.Y. 2000).
10. Id. at 104.
11. Id. at 102.
12. Criscione v. City of New York, 762 N.E.2d 342, 345 (N.Y. 2001).
13. Id. at 343; see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 114-b (Consol. 2003).
14. Criscione, 762 N.E.2d at 343: see N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1104(e).




tort liability cannot be fixed for the State's performance of a gov-
ernmental function. 6 The plaintiff must demonstrate that the
State, through direct personal contact, assumed an affirmative duty
to act on the injured party's behalf, which was conveyed to the in-
jured party and subsequently relied upon. 17 Courts have recently
focused on the most critical element of the special relationship, the
injured party's justifiable reliance on the government's assur-
ances."' The plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct ac-
tually placed her in a more dangerous position by creating a false
sense of security, causing her to relax her guard and not pursue
other options of protection.' 9
Similarly, the court reiterated that immunity protects discretion-
ary engineering decisions made by municipalities.2 0 Recently, the
court confirmed that the decision to install a traffic control device
is a purely discretionary governmental function, which is com-
pletely protected from liability by qualified immunity.2' "Some-
thing more than a choice between conflicting opinions of experts is
required before a governmental body may be held liable for negli-
gently performing its traffic planning function. '22 "[N]either let-
ters urging [a municipality] to install a signal nor the
recommendation by the [private engineer] that one be installed
raises an issue of fact concerning the reasonableness of the [munic-
ipality's] determination.2 z3
Finally, the court discussed whether a party to a contract may be
liable in tort to a third party. 4 Although a contractual obligation
alone does not give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party, the
court articulated three specific exceptions that would create liabil-
ity in such circumstances.25
16. Id.
17. Id. at 414.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 415.
20. See Affleck v. Buckley, 758 N.E.2d 651, 653-54 (N.Y. 2001).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 654.
23. Id. at 653
24. See Church v. Callanan Indus., 782 N.E.2d 50, 52 (N.Y. 2002); Espinal v. Mel-
ville Snow Contractors, 773 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 2002).
25. Church, 782 N.E.2d at 53.
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I. STRICT TIME LIMITATIONS FOR FILING CLAIM AGAINST
THE STATE
In Alston v. State of New York,26 the Court of Appeals stressed
the potential rigidity of the time limitations for filing a claim
against the State, pursuant to the Court of Claims Act.27 In Alston,
after an unsuccessful attempt in federal court by parole officers to
recover overtime allegedly earned, the claimants filed a proceeding
in the Court of Claims to obtain the same monetary reward.28 The
Court of Claims granted the State's motion to dismiss the claims
because the claimants failed to timely file their claims pursuant to
section 10(4) of the Court of Claims Act. 9
"The State's waiver of sovereign immunity was not absolute, but
[specifically] conditioned upon claimant's compliance with the [re-
quirements accompanying] the waiver, including the .. .filing [of]
deadlines."3 "The Court of Claims Act could not be [more] clear
in conditioning the waiver of sovereign immunity on compliance
with the [established] time limitations . . . ."I' The unequivocal
language of the Act states that, "no judgment shall be granted in
favor of any claimant, unless [the] claimant" complies with the ex-
isting time limitations. 32 "[B]ecause the claimants failed to [timely]
file their claims in the Court of Claims ... and did not timely seek
relief from the Court under the Court of Claims Act [section]
10(6), the State was entitled to dismissal of the claim on sovereign
immunity grounds. '33
II. REVISITING THE "SERIOUS INJURY" STANDARD UNDER
INSURANCE LAW
The Court of Appeals has addressed the "serious injury" stan-
dard within the meaning of No-Fault Law, New York State Insur-
26. Alston v. State, 762 N.E.2d 923 (N.Y. 2001).
27. Id. at 926.
28. Id. at 924.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 926.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting N.Y. CT. CL. Acr § 10 (Consol. 2001)).
33. Id.; see Clark v. City of New York, 739 N.Y.S.2d 624, 624-25 (App. Div. 2002);
James v. City of New York, 662 N.Y.S.2d 542, 543 (App. Div. 1997); Deegan v. City of
New York, 643 N.Y.S.2d 596, 597 (App. Div. 1996); Ragin v. City of New York, 636
N.Y.S.2d 83, 84 (App. Div. 1995); Lamper v. City of New York, 626 N.Y.S.2d 253, 253




ance Law section 5102(d),34 in several decisions during the past two
years. The No-Fault Law provides a system whereby victims of au-
tomobile accidents can receive compensation for their economic
losses without regard to fault or negligence.3 5 An injured party
may still bring an action to recover for non-economic loss, pain,
and suffering, as long as the plaintiff can demonstrate that she has
suffered a "serious injury" within the definition of No-Fault Law.36
In Oberly v. Bangs Ambulance, the court indicated "that only a
'total loss' of use [of a body organ, member, function, or system] is
compensable as a 'permanent loss of use' exception to the no-fault
remedy. '37 In Oberly, the plaintiff suffered a minor injury to his
forearm when a pump fell on his arm while he was being trans-
ported in an ambulance. 38 The court held that "the statute speaks
in terms of a loss of a body member, without qualification. '39 Ad-
ditionally, "requiring a total loss is consistent with the statutory
[language] of the categories 'permanent consequential limitation of
use of a body or organ or member' and 'significant limitation of use
of a body function or system."' 4 ° Accordingly, only a total loss of
use is compensable under the permanent loss of use exception.4 '
A. Nature and Extent of Qualified, Objective Medical Evidence
Necessary to Meet the Serious Injury Threshold
In Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Systems,42 the court consolidated
three appeals and focused specifically on the nature and extent of
qualified, objective medical evidence required to overcome the se-
rious injury threshold.43 Initially, the court noted that the legisla-
34. "Serious injury" means a personal injury which results in death; dismem-
berment; significant disfigurement; a fracture; loss of a fetus; permanent loss
of use of a body organ, member, function or system; permanent consequent-
ial limitation of use of a body organ or member; significant limitation of use
of a body function or system; or a medically determined injury or impair-
ment of a non-permanent nature which prevents the injured person from
performing substantially all the material acts which constitutes such person's
usual and customary daily activities for not less than ninety days during the
one hundred eighty days immediately following the occurrence of the injury
or impairment.
N.Y. INs. LAw § 5102 (d) (Consol. 2003).
35. Oberly v. Bangs Ambulance, 751 N.E.2d 457, 459 (N.Y. 2001).
36. Id. at 458.
37. Id. at 459.
38. Id. at 458-59.
39. Id at 460.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 458.
42. Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 774 N.E.2d 1197 (N.Y. 2002).
43. Id. at 1204-05.
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tive intent of the No-Fault Law was to eliminate "frivolous claims
and limit recovery to serious injuries. ' 44 The court stressed that
objective medical evidence of a plaintiff's injury is required to sat-
isfy the serious injury threshold.45 An expert's quantitative and
qualitative assessment of a plaintiff's condition may substantiate a
claim, "provided that the evaluation [is supported by] an objective
basis and compares the plaintiff's limitations to the normal func-
tion, purpose and use of the affected body [part]. 46
In one case, the plaintiff submitted an affirmation of a neurosur-
geon to oppose defendant's motion for summary judgment. 47 The
court held that the plaintiff, at a minimum, created an issue of fact
by submitting an expert's affirmation supported by objective medi-
cal evidence, including Magnetic Resonance Image ("MRI") and
Computerized Tomography ("CT") scan tests and reports and per-
sonal observations, which sufficiently described the qualitative na-
ture of the plaintiff's limitations. 48 Similarly, in the second case,
the treating orthopedic surgeon described the qualitative nature of
plaintiff's limitations based on the normal function, including the
plaintiff's own medical history, physical examination, and review of
the MRI scan.49
In the final case, the court held that the plaintiff's doctor failed
to adequately demonstrate a significant limitation.50 Although the
doctor detected a back spasm, he failed to articulate what objective
test, if any, induced the spasm. 5' Additionally, the expert's conclu-
sion was based, in part, on a review of an MRI report that was
never introduced into evidence, thus foreclosing cross-
examination.52
B. Threshold for "Serious Injury" Under Insurance Law
Requires Admissible, Verified, Objective
Medical Findings
Previously, the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, Second Department thoroughly clarified the specific type and
quality of admissible evidence necessary to sustain a "serious in-
44. Id. at 1199-1200.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1200.
47. Id. at 1200-01.
48. Id. at 1202.
49. Id. at 1202-03.
50. Id. at 1204.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1204-05.
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jury" claim. Accident victims must present admissible evidence
that contains verified, quantitative, objective medical results in or-
der to successfully establish a prima facie case that the plaintiff sus-
tained a "serious injury. 53
In Grossman v. Wright, the plaintiff alleged that, as a result of a
motor vehicle accident, he sustained an injury to his back 4.5  "The
plaintiff specifically alleged that as a result of the accident, he sus-
tained a 'significant limitation of use of a body function or sys-
tem.' ' '5 5 The defendant moved for summary judgment "on the
ground that the plaintiff failed to establish that he had sustained a
serious injury. ' 56 "In support of [the] motion, the defendant sup-
plied ... affirmed medical reports prepared by ... an orthopedic
surgeon and . . . a radiologist. '57  The plaintiff submitted an un-
sworn affidavit prepared by a chiropractor. 8
Applying an interpretation of the legislative intent, the Court of
Appeals determined that the word "significant," as applied to
"'limitation of use of a body function or system,' should be con-
strued to mean something more than a minor limitation of use." 59
A "minor, mild or slight limitation of use should be classified as
insignificant within the meaning of the statute. ' 60 The "legislative
intent of the 'no-fault' legislation was to [eliminate] frivolous
claims and [restrict] recovery to major or significant injuries. "61
Accordingly, "summary judgment should be granted in cases where
the plaintiff's opposition [consists solely of] 'conclusory assertions
tailored to meet statutory requirements.' , 62
C. Defendant Establishes Injuries Are Not "Serious" Through
Admissible Medical Evidence
"[A] defendant can establish that the plaintiff's injuries are not
serious within the meaning of [section] 5102(d) by submitting affi-
53. Grossman v. Wright, 707 N.Y.S.2d 233, 234 (App. Div. 2000).




58. Id. at 235-36.
59. Id. at 236 (quoting Licari v. Elliot, 441 N.E.2d 1088, 1091 (N.Y. 1982)).
60. Id.
61. Id.; Milne v. Cheema, 706 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (App. Div. 2000).
62. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 236-37 (citing Lopez v. Senatore, 65 N.Y.S.2d 1017,
1019 (App. Div. 1985)); see Walker v. Betts Cab Corp., 710 N.Y.S.2d 28, 28-29 (App.
Div. 2000) (concluding that plaintiff's medical evidence was unsworn, conclusory, and
speculative); Decayette v. Kreger Truck Renting, Inc., 687 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (App.
Div. 1999) (detailing how a plaintiff doctor relied on inadmissible medical records).
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davits or affirmations of medical experts who examined the plain-
tiff and conclude[d] that no objective medical findings support the
plaintiff's claim."'6 3 The medical report prepared by the defen-
dant's orthopedic surgeon in Grossman stated that he had con-
ducted an independent medical examination of the plaintiff two
days earlier.64 After a brief absence from work, the plaintiff re-
sumed his full work responsibilities and was no longer undergoing
any treatments or taking any prescription medication.6 5 The defen-
dant's chiropractor and radiologist specified the observations made
and the objective medical records and tests conducted on the plain-
tiff during the physical examination.66 The diagnosis was that any
minor problems were resolved or unrelated to the accident.67
D. Plaintiff Must Submit Verified Objective Medical Evidence
Once the defendant has demonstrated prima facie entitlement to
summary judgment, the "burden [then] shifts to the plaintiff to
come forward with evidence to overcome the defendant's submis-
sions by demonstrating a triable issue of fact that a serious injury
was sustained ....',68 "The plaintiff in such a situation must pre-
sent objective evidence of the injury. The mere parroting of lan-
guage tailored to meet statutory requirements is insufficient."6 9
A plaintiff's subjective claim of pain and limitation of motion
must be supported by quantitative "verified objective medical find-
ings," based on objective tests and a recent examination of the
plaintiff."' Accordingly, any considerable delay between the con-
clusion of the "plaintiff's medical treatments after the accident and
the physical examination conducted by his own expert must be ad-
equately explained."'"
63. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (citing Turchuk v. Town of Wallkill, 681.
N.Y.S.2d 72, 72-73 (App. Div. 1998)).




68. Id. at 237 (citing Gaddy v. Eyler, 591 N.E.2d 1176, 1176 (N.Y. 1992)).
69. Id. (citing Powell v. Hurdle, 625 N.Y.S.2d 634, 634-35 (App. Div. 1995); Gian-
nakis v. Paschilidou, 622 N.Y.S.2d 112, 113 (App. Div. 1995)); Decayette v. Kreger
Truck Renting, Inc., 687 N.Y.S.2d 680, 681 (App. Div. 1999).
70. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (citing Kauderer v. Penta, 689 N.Y.S.2d 190,
191-92 (App. Div. 1999) (emphasis added)); Garland v. Allison, 705 N.Y.S.2d 682,
682-83 (App. Div. 2000).
71. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (citing Smith v. Askew, 695 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406
(App. Div. 1999)); see Jimenez v. Kambli, 708 N.Y.S.2d 460, 461 (App. Div. 2000);




In opposition to the motion, the plaintiff in Grossman submitted
his own affidavit, as well as an affirmation by a doctor of chiroprac-
tic medicine, and other medical records, which were presented in
unsworn and inadmissible form.72 The plaintiff complained that he
had been forced to make lifestyle changes as a result of the injuries,
that he experienced daily pain, and he could no longer participate
in vigorous athletic activities he previously enjoyed.73 As part of
the examination, the plaintiff's chiropractor performed range of
motion tests on the plaintiff's spine, where he found slight restric-
tions in the range of motion. 4
The affirmed report of a medical expert must not only contain
objective clinical findings, but also must demonstrate that the
plaintiff's injuries are causally related to the subject accident.7 5
Physical examinations personally conducted by the doctor prepar-
ing the affidavit or affirmation are sufficient. 76 "An affidavit or
affirmation simply setting forth the observations of the affiant are
insufficient, [however,] unless supported by objective proof, such
as X-rays, MRIs, or other similarly-recognized tests or quantitative
results based on a neurological examination. '77
E. Opposition in Grossman in Inadmissible Form and Failed to
Describe Objective Tests
The court in Grossman held that the evidence submitted by the
defendant in support of her motion was sufficient to establish a
prima facie case that the plaintiff did not sustain a "serious" in-
jury.78 The medical opinions expressed by the defendant's doctors
were supported by a personal physical examination of the plaintiff,
72. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 235-36.
73. Id. at 236.
74. Id.
75. Williams v. Hasenflue, 708 N.Y.S.2d 343, 343 (App. Div. 2000); Latiuk v.
Cona, 708 N.Y.S.2d 531, 531 (App. Div. 2000); Har-Sinay v. Accessible Windows &
Glass & Mirror Corp., 708 N.Y.S.2d 634, 634 (App. Div. 2000).
76. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 237 (citing Cesar v. Felix, 581 N.Y.S.2d 411, 411-12
(App. Div. 1992)).
77. Id.; see Garvey v. Riela, 708 N.Y.S.2d 148, 149 (App. Div. 2000); Green v.
Miranda, 708 N.Y.S.2d 310, 311 (App. Div. 2000); Mitchell v. Kowalski, 708 N.Y.S.2d
437, 438 (App. Div. 2000); Jimenez v. Kambli, 708 N.Y.S.2d 460, 461 (App. Div.
2000); Pramnieks v. Bush, 707 N.Y.S.2d 682, 683 (App. Div. 2000); Kraemer v. Hen-
ning, 655 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (App. Div. 1997); Zalduondo v. Lazowska, 651 N.Y.S.2d
117, 117 (App. Div. 1996); Kim v. Cohen, 618 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387 (App. Div. 1994);
Georgia v. Ramautar, 579 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (App. Div. 1992); Spezia v. DeMarco,
570 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (App. Div. 1991).
78. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
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a review of plaintiff's medical records, and the objective physical
tests performed on the plaintiff. 9
By contrast, the court found that the plaintiff's opposition was
insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact." ° The medical evidence
submitted consisted of various reports which were not in admissi-
ble form."' The affirmation of the plaintiff's chiropractor was not
subscribed before a notary or equivalent authorized official, and
therefore was not deemed competent evidence.82 Regardless, the
report failed to present a triable issue of fact as to whether the
plaintiff sustained a serious injury, as the report was void of any
description of any objective tests performed that substantiated the
doctor's conclusions concerning the claimed restrictions in the
plaintiff's motion.83
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS CLARIFIES ARTICLE 16
APPORTIONMENT FOR CASES INVOLVING JOINT AND
SEVERAL LIABILITY
Article 16 of the CPLR, adopted as part of 1986 Tort Reform
Legislation, was drafted to address inequities created by the com-
mon law rule of joint and several liability. 4 "Prior to the [enact-
ment of Article 16,] a joint tortfeasor could be held liable for an
entire judgment, regardless of the relative share of culpability."85
Thus, joint and several liability provided an incentive to sue "deep
pocket" defendants, including municipalities, even if they were
only minimally involved with the injury causing event. In 1986, the
Governor's Advisory Commission on Liability Insurance recom-
mended that the rule of joint and several liability be amended "to
assure that no defendant who is assigned a minor degree of fault
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (citing Pagano v. Kingsbury, 587 N.Y.S.2d 692, 693-95 (App. Div. 1992)).
82. Id. at 238 (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2106 (Consol. 2003)); see Bernadel v. Beran,
704 N.Y.S.2d 289, 290 (App. Div. 2000); Perry v. Pagano, 699 N.Y.S.2d 882, 882 (App.
Div. 1999); Young v. Ryan, 697 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (App. Div. 1999): Doumanis v.
Conzo, 696 N.Y.S.2d 201, 202 (App. Div. 1999): Valencia v. Lui, 657 N.Y.S.2d 1007,
1007 (App. Div. 1997); Gill v. O.N.S. Trucking, 657 N.Y.S.2d 452, 453 (App. Div.
1997).
83. Grossman, 707 N.Y.S.2d at 238.
84. Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 749 N.E.2d 178, 181 (N.Y. 2001); Morales v.
County of Nassau, 724 N.E.2d 756, 759 (N.Y. 1999).
85. Rangolan, 749 N.E.2d at 181 (citing Sommer v. Fed. Signal Corp., 593 N.E.2d
1365, 1372 (N.Y. 1992)).
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can be forced to pay an amount grossly out of proportion to that
assignment."86
CPLR section 1601 provides that when there is a verdict for a
plaintiff in a personal injury action involving multiple tortfeasors
who are jointly liable, and the liability of one of the defendants is
found to be fifty percent or less of the total liability, the liability of
such defendant for non-economic loss shall not exceed the defen-
dant's equitable share.87 Although Article 16 was intended to rem-
edy the inequities created by joint and several liability where one
defendant is found to be minimally at fault, yet where "deep
pocket" defendants, including municipalities, remain subject to va-
rious exceptions that preserve the traditional rule.88
Initially, CPLR section 1602 established that the limitations cre-
ated by the general rule in section 1601 do not apply to cases in-
volving the use or operation of motor vehicles, although
municipalities are entitled to protection for accidents involving fire
or police vehicles. Additionally, section 1602(2)(iv) excludes ap-
portionment protection for "any liability arising by the reason of a
non-delegable duty."89 The plain language of CPLR section
1602(2)(iv) clearly indicates that the legislature did not intend to
create an exception to the apportionment rule, but rather section
1602(2)(iv) was drafted to preserve the principles of vicarious lia-
bility and prevent defendants from improperly disclaiming respon-
sibility for non-delegable duties.90
A. Rangolan v. County of Nassau
In Rangolan, the plaintiff, who had cooperated as a confidential
informant against other inmates, was seriously beaten by a fellow
inmate while incarcerated. 9' Although the plaintiff's inmate file
specifically cautioned that he was not to be housed with his assail-
ant, the two inmates were placed in the same dormitory.92 In
Rangolan, the plaintiff commenced a federal action against the
County of Nassau, alleging, among other things, negligence for fail-
ure to protect him while in custody and violation of his Eighth
86. Id. at 182.
87. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601 (Consol. 2003).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 1602(2)(iv).
90. See Rangolan, 749 N.E.2d at 182-83.
91. Id. at 181.
92. Id.
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Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 93 The district court dis-
missed his § 1983 claim, but granted judgment as a matter of law
on his negligence claim.94 The court refused to instruct the jury on
apportionment of damages between the county and the attacker,
holding that CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) prohibited apportionment
where the defendant's liability arose from a breach of a non-dele-
gable duty.95
Following a damages award for pain and suffering, both parties
appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.96 The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the 1983
claim, but, noting the absence of controlling precedent interpreting
CPLR section 1602(2)(iv), certified to the New York State Court of
Appeals the question whether a municipal tortfeasor can seek to
apportion its liability with another tortfeasor, pursuant to CPLR
section 1601, or whether CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) precludes such
apportionment. 97
B. CPLR Section 1602(2)(iv) Is Not an Exception to
Apportionment, but a Savings Provision that Preserves
Vicarious Liability
The Court of Appeals held that under the facts and circum-
stances of the case in Rangolan, the defendant was permitted to
seek apportionment of its liability with another tortfeasor, such as
the other inmate. 98 The fact that "the precise 'shall not apply' lan-
guage [drafted] by the legislature to [delineate] the exceptions" to
the rule is absent "in section 1602(2)(iv) indicates that the legisla-
ture [did not] intend to include an exception for liability based on a
breach of a non-delegable duty." 99 Therefore, the court in Rango-
lan held that CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) does not create an excep-
tion to apportionment, but is a "savings provision that preserves
the principles of vicarious liability."' 00
93. Id.; see Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 51 F. Supp. 2d 233, 233 (E.D.N.Y.
1999), affd in part, question certified by, 216 F.3d 1073 (2d Cir. 2000).
94. Rangolan, 749 N.E.2d at 181.
95. Id.; Sanchez v. State, 2002 N.Y. LEXIS 3578, at *1 (N.Y. Nov. 21, 2002) (de-
ciding whether an attack on an inmate was foreseeable and holding that the question
raised a triable issue of fact).
96. Rangolan, 749 N.E.2d at 181.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 184
99. Id. at 182-83.
100. Id. at 181; Rucker v. Allis, 732 N.Y.S.2d 493, 494 (App. Div. 2001); Grant v.
Ore, 725 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387-88 (App. Div. 2001) (detailing claim by passenger injured
in automobile accident when driver failed to see maintenance work site on bridge).
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CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) was drafted to prevent defendants
from disclaiming liability for duties for which they are responsible
by delegating such responsibilities to another party.1"' Accord-
ingly, CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) ensures that a defendant is liable
to the same extent as its delegate or employee, and that CPLR
Article 16 is not construed to alter this liability. 10 2 When a munici-
pality delegates a duty for which it is legally responsible, such as
the maintenance of its roads, the municipality remains vicariously
liable for the negligence of the contractor, and cannot rely on
CPLR section 1601(1) to apportion liability with regard to its con-
tractor. 103 Similarly, CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) prohibits an em-
ployer from disclaiming respondeat superior liability by arguing
that an employee was the actual tortfeasor. 10 4 "[N]othing in CPLR
1602(2)(iv)," however, "precludes a municipality, landowner or
employer from seeking apportionment between itself and other
tortfeasors for whose liability it is not answerable."'0 5
"[Section] 1602 [contains] several exceptions to the apportion-
ment rule, [that] explicitly [state] that Article 16 shall 'not apply' in
certain circumstances."'10 6 The Rangolan court reasoned that
CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) specifically does not contain the "shall
not apply" introductory language, "but instead provides that the
limitations on liability shall 'not be construed' to impair, limit or
modify any liability arising from a non-delegable duty or respon-
deat superior."' 117 The court in Rangolan held that "the Legislature
did not intend 1602(2)(iv) to establish a free-standing exception to
the apportionment rule."'0° "[Section] 1602(2)(iv) was [simply] in-
tended to insure that the courts did not [interpret] article 16 as
altering [established] law regarding respondeat superior or non-
delegable duties."109
The fact that CPLR section 1602(8), using the "shall not apply"
language, creates a separate non-delegable duty exception, rein-
forces that section 1602(2)(iv) was not intended as an exception to




105. Id. (citations omitted); see Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 749 N.E.2d 184,185-
86 (N.Y. 2001); Grant, 725 N.Y.S.2d at 388; Denio v. State, 723 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915
(App. Div. 2001).
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the apportionment rule. "° "To construe CPLR 1602(2)(iv) as cre-
ating a blanket non-delegable duty exception would render CPLR
1602(8) meaningless and redundant." '111 A statutory construction
that "'result[s] in the nullification of one part of a [statute] by an-
other,' is impermissible" because the various elements of a statute
must be compatible with each other and conform with the general
intent of the statute.' 12
Given the breadth of responsibilities that may be considered
non-delegable, each potentially requiring a specific inquiry, the leg-
islature could not have intended to exclude the breach of every
non-delegable duty from possible apportionment.' 13 "Reading
[section] 1602(2)(iv) as an exception would impose joint and sev-
eral liability on municipalities ... the[] ... precise[] ... entities
that [the rule] was designed to protect."1'1 4
In Faragiano, the plaintiff was a passenger injured in a motor
vehicle accident who commenced an action against several parties,
including "the contractor that resurfaced the road and the Town of
Concord ... alleg[ing] that the Town negligently constructed and
maintained [the] road and that [the] contractor ... negligently per-
mitted a build-up of oil or tar on the road."'1 5 "The Town asserted,
as an affirmative defense, that its liability for any noneconomic
losses should be apportioned among the other tortfeasors pursuant
to CPLR [section 1602(2)(iv)]," while the plaintiffs argued that
CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) precluded apportionment. ' 6 The court
in Faragiano held that the "plaintiffs [could] not rely on CPLR
[section] 1602(2)(iv) to preclude the Town from seeking apportion-
ment between itself and other joint tortfeasors for whose liability it
was not answerable." ' 7 The court went on to State, however, that
the town could not use CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) to apportion lia-
bility to the agent for whom it was vicariously responsible." 8





115. Faragiano v. Town of Concord, 749 N.E.2d 184, 186 (N.Y. 2001).
116. Id.
117. Id.; see Grant v. Ore, 725 N.Y.S.2d 386, 387-88 (App. Div. 2001).
118. Faragiano, 749 N.E.2d at 186.
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C. Recent Rulings Concerning Apportionment Relating to
Premises Security
Recently, three separate Appellate Division First Department
panels issued rulings concerning Article 16 apportionment. In all
three cases, the named defendants were sued for simple negligence
for failing to secure the premises against an assailant, not named as
a party, that injured the plaintiff.
In Concepcion v. New York City Health and Hospitals Corpora-
tion, the plaintiff was stabbed by an out-patient while visiting a
hospital. 19 Following a threatening confrontation with the out-pa-
tient, plaintiff informed a nurse about the incident, who assured
the plaintiff that she would alert security. 120 The nurse failed to
inform security and the plaintiff was assaulted. 12' The Court in
Concepcion held that:
[t]here is nothing in the exclusion that would indicate that it was
intended to preclude a negligent tortfeasor from seeking appor-
tionment from [a non-party] intentional tortfeasor. Moreover,
any further extension of the exclusion would defeat the purpose
of Article 16, which is to protect low-fault, "deep pocket" de-
fendants from being fully liable pursuant to joint and several
liability rules.' 22
Chianese v. Meier involved allegations of inadequate building se-
curity.123 The court held that the fact that an assailant had acted
intentionally did not elevate the purely negligent behavior of the
other actors to intentional conduct, thus entitling the defendant
building owner and manager to Article 16 protection. 24 Accord-
ingly, apportionment of damages for personal injuries is permissi-
ble between a negligent landlord and a nonparty intentional
tortfeasor.125




122. Id. at 480; see Roseboro v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474-75
(App. Div. 2001) (finding that apportionment is available against non-party inten-
tional tortfeasors); Maria E. v. 599 West Assocs., 726 N.Y.S.2d 237, 242-43 (Sup. Ct.
2001) (providing pleading requirements of Article 16 apportionment).
123. Chianese v. Meier, 774 N.E.2d 722, 723 (N.Y. 2002).
124. Id. at 725-26.
125. See id. at 726; see also N.X. v. Cabrini Med. Ctr., 228 N.Y. L.J., Oct. 28, 2002,
at 25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.).
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D. Intentional Act of Non-Party Tortfeasor Does Not Bring
Pure Negligence Action Within Section
1602(5) Exclusion
Section 1602 excepts certain types of actions from the ambit of
section 1601, including "actions requiring proof of intent." 126 "This
exception applies to prevent defendants who are found to have
committed an intentional tort from invoking the benefits of section
1601. "127 In Chianese, a tenant sued her landlord and building
manager for negligence, alleging inadequate building security, after
she was assaulted inside the building.128 The attacker was later ap-
prehended and convicted of a series of crimes, including the attack
on the plaintiff. 29 A jury found the landlord and manager fifty
percent responsible for the assault, and apportioned damages on
that basis. 3 " The plaintiff in Chianese argued that her negligence
claim against defendants, because it necessarily involved an inten-
tional act by her attacker, was also an "action requiring proof of
intent," thus precluding apportionment by defendants.131
"Because the plaintiff's negligence claim is not an 'action requir-
ing proof of intent,' section 1602(5), on its face, does not apply to
preclude apportionment of liability."'' 32 The defendants' liability,
in Chianese, did not depend on proof of the attacker's state of
mind. 3 3 The plaintiff merely had to prove that "she was injured as
a result of the defendants' failure to provide adequate security on
the premises."' 34 The mere fact "that a nonparty tortfeasor acted
intentionally does not bring a pure negligence action within the
scope of the exclusion."'' 35
"While section 1602(5) forecloses intentional tortfeasors from
seeking apportionment irrespective of the mental state of any other
tortfeasors, section 1602(11) precludes apportionment with any
parties found to have acted knowingly or intentionally and in con-
cert." ' 36 "The primary purpose of [section 1602](11) is ... to pre-
126. Chianese, 774 N.E.2d at 724.
127. Id. at 724-25.
128. Id. at 723.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 724-25.




135. Id.; see Roseboro v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 729 N.Y.S.2d 472, 475 (App. Div.
2001); Concepcion v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 729 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480 (App.
Div. 2001); Siler v. 146 Montague Assocs., 652 N.Y.S.2d 315, 321 (App. Div. 1997).
136. Chianese, 774 N.E.2d at 726.
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vent apportionment among multiple intentional tortfeasors ...
when dividing liability among them would [place] them under the
section 1601 [fifty percent guideline].' 37 This interpretation of
section 1602(5) is consistent with the exception to apportionment
set out in section 1602(11) and "does not render section 1602(11)
duplicative."' 38
What little legislative history there is accords with the reading of
section 1602(5) which indicates that Article 16 preserves joint and
several liability for instances where a defendant performs acts are
willfully or intentionally performed in concert with others.'39 Con-
versely, there is "no indication in the legislative history that section
1602(5) was intended to create what would amount to a broad ex-
ception to apportionment at the expense of the low-fault, merely
negligent landowners and municipalities-the very parties article
16 intended to benefit."1 40
In Chianese, under the plaintiff's proposed reading of the statute,
the right of a low-fault defendant to benefit from apportionment:
would depend entirely on the nature of the culpability of the
third-party tortfeasor. A negligent defendant could apportion
liability with a negligent or reckless third-party tortfeasor, but
not an intentional tortfeasor .... Such a result is not only illogi-
cal but also inconsistent with the [legislative intent and] chief
remedial purpose of article 16.141
The unequivocal language of CPLR section 1602(2)(iv) bespeaks
that the legislature did not intend to create an exception to the
apportionment rule. Section 1602(2)(iv) does not contain the pre-
cise language, explicitly present in other areas of CPLR section
1602, necessary to create an exception. CPLR section 1602(2)(iv)
was formulated to simply preserve the principles of vicarious
liability.
IV. MUNICIPAL VEHICLES ARE PROTECTED BY A
RECKLESSNESS STANDARD WHILE ENGAGED IN WORK
ON A HIGHWAY
The Court of Appeals recently confirmed that "recklessness"
was the proper standard of care to apply to "hazard" vehicles,




140. Id.; Rangolan v. County of Nassau, 749 N.E.2d 178, 182 (N.Y. 2001).
141. Chianese, 774 N.E.2d at 726 (citations omitted).
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York Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") section 1103(b). At the
same time, the court rejected the argument that such vehicles must
be located in a designated "work area" in order to qualify for the
hazard vehicle exemption.
In Riley v. County of Broome and Wilson v. New York, the Court
of Appeals addressed two independent situations that involved in-
juries resulting from automobile collisions with a municipal street
sweeper and snow plow respectively. 142 The trial courts dismissed,
and the Appellate Division affirmed both personal injury claims,
finding that, under VTL section 1103(b), "all vehicles engaged in
'highway maintenance' are exempt from the rules of the road and
subject ... to [the higher] recklessness standard."' 143
The Vehicle and Traffic Law section 117's definition of a "hazard
vehicle" includes a municipal vehicle engaged in highway mainte-
nance or ice and snow removal, where such operation involves the
use of a public highway. 144 "Hazardous operation" is defined in
VTL section 117-b as, "the operation, or parking, of a vehicle on
or ... adjacent to a public highway while such vehicle is actually
engaged in an operation which would.., interfere with the normal
traffic flow .. .
Obviously, a certain "degree of risk ... is inherent in travel on
public highways."' 146 Particular classes of vehicles are intended to
reduce the risks involved in highway travel by maintaining the
safety of roadways. 147 "While serving an important public func-
tion, however, [such] vehicles may themselves cause [certain] risks
to [routine] motorists." 148
"At common law, all vehicles, including emergency vehicles,
were held to an ordinary negligence standard."'' 9 The common
law and various statutes also recognized that the level of care owed
by emergency and roadwork vehicles must be tempered by the na-
ture of their work, providing certain exceptions to the rules of the
142. Riley v. County of Broome, 742 N.E.2d 98, 99 (N.Y. 2000).
143. Id. at 100; Kearns v. Piatt, 716 N.Y.S.2d 418, 419 (App. Div. 2000) (applying
the recklessness standard to a municipal truck applying sand and salt mixture to icy
road); Wilson v. State, 703 N.Y.S.2d 848, 848-49 (App. Div. 2000) (affirming decision
exempting snowplow plowing snow on a highway); Gawelko v. State, 710 N.Y.S.2d
762, 763-65 (Ct. Cl. 2000) (holding a snowplow that lost control was exempt).
144. Riley, 742 N.E.2d at 100.
145. Id. at 100 n.1 (quoting N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 117-b (Consol. 1996)).
146. Id. at 100.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 101.
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road for such vehicles.15 ° "Nevertheless, the common law required
that such vehicles ... [act] with care and caution [proportional to]
the purpose and necessity of the right. 151
Vehicle and Traffic Law section 1103(b) explicitly states that the
rules of the road do not apply to vehicles "while actually engaged
in work on a highway. '152 Section 1103(b) further states that such
operators shall not be protected from the consequences of "reck-
less disregard for the safety of others. '153
In Bliss v. New York, 154 the claimant impacted the rear of a New
York State Thruway Authority ("NYSTA") truck that was operat-
ing in reverse as part of a three truck crew dismantling a lane clo-
sure on a bridge.' 55 The court in Bliss held that even though the
state driver pled guilty to the VTL violation of unsafe backing, and
may have failed to adhere to NYSTA's regulations for operating a
truck in reverse on a highway, his conduct did not rise to the level
of recklessness required by section 1103(b). 56 "The recklessness
standard requires more than a showing of lack of due care, which is
associated with ordinary negligence," such as a violation of an ad-
ministrative regulation or traffic rule.' 57
Section 1103(b) adds that VTL section 1202(a), "which regulates
stopping, standing, and parking, does not apply to hazard vehicles
while actually engaged in hazardous operation on ... the highway,
but shall apply to such vehicles when traveling to or from such haz-
ardous operation."'158  "Similarly, [VTL section] 1104 exempts
'emergency vehicles,' such as ambulances, police.., and fire vehi-
cles, [from the rules of the road while] engaged in emergency oper-
ations, subject to [certain] conditions."1 59
The plain language of these statutes clearly states that vehicles
actually engaged in work on a highway, similar to emergency vehi-
cles engaged in emergency operations, are exempt from the rules
of the road, regardless of their classification. 6 ° The statute does





154. 686 N.Y.S.2d 556 (Ct. Cl. 1998).
155. Id. at 558.
156. Id. at 560.
157. Id.
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nor does it deny "hazard vehicles" the special protection given to
all vehicles actually engaged in roadwork. 161
"The primary consideration of courts in interpreting a statute is
to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature....
[T]he words of the statute are the best evidence of the Legislature's
intent ... [and] unambiguous language is alone determinative. 1 ' 6 2
The history of section 1103(b) evidences that the legislature in-
tended to create an expansive exemption from the rules of the road
for all vehicles engaged in highway construction and maintenance,
regardless of their classification.
Thus, the exemption [focuses] on the nature of the work being
performed, not on the nature of the vehicle employed for the
work.
Further, the legislative history shows that the reference to "haz-
ard vehicles" in section 1103(b) is wholly unrelated to the provi-
sion excusing vehicles engaged in road work from the rules of
the road. Notably, the original version of section 1103(b) ex-
empted vehicles "engaged in work on a highway" from the rules
of the road, [but] did not contain any separate provisions con-
cerning hazard vehicles. In 1970, the legislature amended the
Vehicle and Traffic Law to [define] the "hazard class" of vehi-
cles ... and amend[ed] section 1103(b) to exempt hazard vehi-
cles from the standing, stopping and parking regulations. 163
The history of the amendment demonstrates that it was intended
to distinguish the classification of different flashing colored lights
on various vehicles, but was not intended to curtail the exemption
for any vehicles. 164
Section 1103(b) does not require that a vehicle be located in a
designated "work area" in order to receive the protection. 65 The
VTL section that defines work area was not enacted until long af-
ter section 1103(b) was adopted. "Thus, there is no credible argu-
ment that the legislature only had designated work areas in mind
when it adopted section 1103(b)."' 166
Originally, section 1103(b) provided vehicles actually engaged in
work on a highway with an unqualified exemption from the rules of
the road.' 61 In 1974, the legislature amended section 1103(b), ad-
161. Id. at 102.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 102- 03 (citations ommitted).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 105.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 103.
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ding that vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway must pro-
ceed with due regard for the safety of others and are not protected
"from the consequences of their reckless disregard for the safety of
others."' 68 The legislative history explains that the "minimum
standard of care" was designed to curtail the outright exemption of
vehicles engaged in road work from the rules of the road. 16 9
In Saarinen v. Kerr, the Court of Appeals held that VTL section
1104(e), which contains identical language requiring emergency ve-
hicles to act with "due regard for the safety of all persons," imposes
a standard of reckless disregard.' Specifically, under section
1104(e), a plaintiff seeking to recover for injuries caused by an
emergency vehicle must show that "the actor has intentionally
done an act of an unreasonable character in disregard of a known
or obvious risk that was so great as to make it highly probable that
harm would follow and has done so with conscious indifference to
the outcome."' 71 Section 1103(b) imposes the same recklessness
standard on vehicles actually engaged in work on a highway.' 72
The legislature's specific reference to reckless disregard would be
unnecessary and, in fact, inexplicable if the conventional criterion
for negligence, reasonable care under the circumstances, were the
intended standard.
In Saarinen, a driver was struck by a police vehicle with its emer-
gency light activated that was engaged in a brief pursuit of a vehicle
that was driving recklessly. 73 The common law and VTL section
1104 recognize that emergency and police vehicles are frequently
faced with emergency situations. 174 The court in Saarinen reasoned
that any standard other than a recklessness standard would result
in judicial second-guessing of split second decisions made by emer-
gency personnel in the midst of highly pressurized situations and
could deter trained emergency personnel from acting decisively to
protect or save human life or property.7 5
As a general principle of statutory construction, when a word is
used in a statute, and subsequently used in a statute concerning the
same topic, it is understood to possess the same meaning for each
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Saarinen v. Kerr, 644 N.E.2d 988, 992-93 (N.Y. 1994).
171. Id. at 991 (citing PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 34, at 213 (W. Page Keeton
et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)).
172. See Riley, 742 N.E.2d at 102.
173. Saarinen, 644 N.E.2d at 989.
174. Id. at 991.
175. Id. at 992.
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application. 176 The "history of section 1103(b) confirms that the
Legislature intended to subject vehicles engaged in road work to
the same standard of care as emergency vehicles."'' 77 In McDon-
ald, the court stated that although the snowplow operator was
clearly negligent in failing to observe the claimants' vehicle before
initiating a lane change, the "improvident determination . . . did
not rise to a level of a reckless disregard for the safety of others so
as to warrant a recovery by claimants."'' 78
Several judges have found it difficult to accept the prevailing in-
terpretation that gives all hazard vehicles more expansive section
1103(b) exemption, regardless of whether in a designated work
area or performing their jobs. 7 9 According to the Court in
Gawelko, rural letter carriers and truck drivers appear to benefit
from greater protection than ambulance drivers and police. 8 ° Al-
though the court indicated that this result defied logic and plain
common sense, "the most fundamental and overriding rule of stat-
utory construction is that courts must give effect to the intent of
the legislature."''
In Cottingham, the court held that the hazard vehicle exception
should be narrowly construed to a limited "work area," as defined
by VTL section 160.182 The court concluded that there is no com-
pelling reason or explicit legislative intent to extend the standard
of ordinary negligence to reckless disregard for the operation of
hazardous vehicles. 183 The court in Cottingham stated that it would
be absurd to provide drivers of hazard vehicles greater protection
than drivers of police vehicles, concluding that VTL sections 1103
and 1104 merely created four distinct categories of vehicles that
each receive varying degrees of protection.18 4
The protection provided to emergency vehicles under section
1104(e) "represents a recognition that the duties of emergency per-
sonnel often bring them into conflict with the rules that are in-
tended to regulate [general] conduct."' 8 5 The court recognized
that the importance of public safety and law enforcement justifies a
176. Riley, 742 N.E.2d at 104.
177. Id.
178. McDonald v. State, 673 N.Y.S.2d 512, 520 (Ct. Cl. 1998).
179. Gawelko v. State, 710 N.Y.S.2d 762, 764 (Ct. Cl. 2000); Cottingham v. State,
701 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292, 298 (Ct. CI. 1999).
180. Gawelko, 710 N.Y.S.2d at 764.
181. Id.
182. Cottingham, 701 N.Y.S.2d at 298-99.
183. Id. at 299.
184. Id. at 300.
185. Riley v. County of Broome, 742 N.E.2d 98, 104-05 (N.Y. 2000).
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qualified privilege afforded to emergency personnel where neces-
sary to conduct their vital responsibilities that "will inevitably in-
crease the risk of harm to innocent motorists and pedestrians."'' 8 6
Although it is unclear that the increased risk to the general public
is similarly justified for all non-emergency vehicles engaged in road
work, the legislature has clearly established that vehicles engaged
in road work enjoy the same benefit of the reduced standard of
care as emergency vehicles. 8 7 Any change in that standard, there-
fore, must come from the legislature.'88
A. Emergency Vehicles Are Entitled to a Reckless Disregard
Standard, Even During Non-Emergency Operations
In Criscione v. City of New York, 8 9 the Court of Appeals held
that a police officer who was driving a patrol car in response to a
non-emergency dispatch call to investigate a family dispute was en-
gaged in the "emergency operation" of a vehicle as defined in New
York State Vehicle and Traffic Law section 114-b. 90 Consequently,
his actions should not have been measured by ordinary negligence
standards, but rather by the "reckless disregard" standard of VTL
section 1104(e).' 9' Whether the police officer violated a New York
City Police Department policy in responding to that type of call
would be an important, but not dispositive, factor in determining
whether he had acted recklessly. 92
Plaintiff and defendant, both New York City police officers, were
traveling in a police radio patrol car during a tour of duty. 93 De-
fendant officer was the driver of the vehicle, while plaintiff sat in
the front passenger seat communicating with the police dispatcher
and writing down the calls received. 94 While traveling to the loca-
tion of a complaint, the patrol car entered an intersection and col-
lided with a civilian vehicle, causing injuries to the plaintiff.195
During the trial, the defendant officer testified that, prior to the




189. 762 N.E.2d 342 (N.Y. 2001).
190. Id. at 345.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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call from a dispatcher.1 96 "In accordance with departmental policy
regarding non-criminal calls, the defendant testified that he did not
increase the speed of the vehicle or activate the siren or turret
lights while driving to the scene, because the call did not fit the
criteria for an emergency response. '"9'
The court in Criscione held that the driver of an "authorized
emergency vehicle" engaged in an "emergency operation" is ex-
empt from certain rules of the road under VTL section 1104.198
Vehicle and Traffic Law section 101 specifically designates a police
vehicle as an "authorized emergency vehicle."' 19 9 Additionally, in-
cluded in the VTL section 114-b description of "emergency opera-
tion" of a vehicle is the operation of an authorized emergency
vehicle, while responding to a police call."' ° This qualified privi-
lege, however, does not relieve the driver "from the duty to drive
with due regard for the safety of all persons," nor shall it protect
the driver from the consequences of his "reckless disregard for the
safety of others." '
The statutory analysis of the relevant VTL sections begins with
determining the plain meaning of each word of the statutory provi-
sions.2 12 Although section 114-b does not define the phrase "police
call," the court in Criscione determined that a radio call to officers
on patrol by a police dispatcher regarding a 911 call falls squarely
within the plain meaning of the term "police call. '203
The court further held that there is no evidence of any "legisla-
tive intent to vary the definition of 'emergency operation' based on
individual police department incident classifications," including,
but not limited to, criminal, non-criminal, or emergency.20 4 The re-
quirements of VTL section 114-b were met in Criscione "as it is
undisputed that [the Defendant] was operating a patrol vehicle
while responding to a police dispatch to investigate a 911 call when
he was involved in the traffic accident. 20 5 Therefore, the court
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 344.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1104(e) (Consol. 2003); Criscione, 762 N.E.2d at
344.






held that as a matter of law, the defendant was involved in an
"emergency operation" at the time of the accident.2 6
"Given the legislative determination that a police dispatch call is
an 'emergency operation,' it is irrelevant whether the officers be-
lieved that the call was an emergency or how the Police Depart-
ment categorized this type of call. ' 20 7 "Whether [the defendant
officer] violated a New York City Police Department policy in re-
sponding to this type of call would [merely] be an important, al-
though not dispositive, factor in determining whether [he] had
acted recklessly. '20 8 The defendant was involved in an "emergency
operation" of an "authorized emergency vehicle" as a matter of
law, and thus, pursuant to VTL section 1104(e) was entitled to a
qualified privilege to disregard the ordinary rules of prudent and
responsible driving, subject to a "reckless disregard" standard of
liability.20 9
V. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY FOR DISCRETIONARY ACTIONS
UNLESS A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP IS PROVEN
The State is protected by immunity for actions or decisions re-
quiring the exercise of discretion. The Appellate Division recently
confirmed that negligent performance of a governmental function,
such as the protection and safety of the public, cannot result in
liability without the demonstration of a "special relationship" be-
tween the injured party and the State.210 In order for liability to
attach, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the State, through direct
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing Saarinen v. Kerr, 644 N.E.2d 988, 992-93 (1994)).
209. Id.
210. Sebastian v. State, 720 N.E.2d 878, 880 (N.Y. 1999); De La Paz v. City of New
York, 743 N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (App. Div. 2002); Clark v. Town of Ticonderoga, 737
N.Y.S.2d 412, 414 (App. Div. 2002); Respass v. City of New York, 733 N.Y.S.2d 210,
211 (App. Div. 2001); Rogers v. State, 732 N.Y.S.2d 805, 806 (App. Div. 2001); Miller
v. State, 716 N.Y.S.2d 762, 763 (App. Div. 2000); D'Avolio v. Prado, 715 N.Y.S.2d 827,
829 (App. Div. 2000); Pfaler v. Town of Friendship, 705 N.Y.S.2d 772, 772 (App. Div.
2000); McEnaney v. State, 700 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260-61 (App. Div. 1999); Haggerty v.
Diamond, 673 N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (App. Div. 1998); Clinger v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.,
650 N.E.2d 855, 856 (1995); Mohamed v. Town of Greenbush, 646 N.Y.S.2d 424, 425
(App. Div. 1996); Gonzalez v. County of Suffolk, 643 N.Y.S.2d 651, 652 (App. Div.
1996); Cardona v. County of Albany, 728 N.Y.S.2d 355, 358 (Sup. Ct. 2001). Similarly,
absent a special relationship, liability cannot be imposed on a governmental agency
for failure to enforce a statute or regulation. Lindsay v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 99
Civ. 3315, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1893, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1999); Gonzalez v.
Barbieri, 705 N.Y.S.2d 399, 400 (App. Div. 2000); Rickson v. Town of Schuyler Falls,
694 N.Y.S.2d 213, 215 (App. Div. 1999); Weiss v. City of New York, 688 N.Y.S.2d 533,
533 (App. Div. 1999); Josyln v. Village of Sylvan Beach, 682 N.Y.S.2d 781, 781 (App.
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personal contact, assumed an affirmative duty to act on the injured
party's personal behalf, which was conveyed to the injured party
and subsequently relied upon.21 The critical element of the special
relationship exception, and the one most difficult to prove, is the
plaintiff's justifiable reliance on the government's assurances.21 2
The plaintiff must prove that the defendant's conduct actually lul-
led her into a false sense of security, caused her to either relax her
vigilance or forego other means of protection, and thereby placed
her in a worse position than she would have been in otherwise. 21 3
The State has always maintained its immunity for governmental
actions requiring expert judgment or the exercise of discretion.21 a
"This immunity ... is absolute when the action involves the con-
scious exercise of discretion of a judicial or quasi-judicial na-
ture." 215 This absolute immunity "reflects the value judgment that
the public interest in having officials free to exercise their discre-
tion unhampered by the fear of retaliatory lawsuits outweighs the
benefits to be had from imposing liability. 216
"It is a well-settled principle that an action of a governmental
employee.., is [protected by] ... immunity.., if the functions and
duties of the ...particular position ...inherently entail[s] the
exercise of ... discretion and judgment. 21 7 "Discretion is indicated
if the powers are to be executed or withheld according to a govern-
mental agent's own view of what is necessary and proper [under
the circumstances]."2 ' Whether immunity applies to a discretion-
ary act depends on whether the position entails making decisions
based on an "exercise of reasoned judgment which could typically
produce different acceptable results. ' 219 Judicial and quasi-judicial
acts are even protected when the decision and results are incorrect
or tainted by improper motives. 220 To hold otherwise would sub-
Div. 1999); Shahin v. City of Yonkers, 678 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669 (App. Div. 1999);
Urbiera v. Hous. Now Co., 709 N.Y.S.2d 910, 913 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
21.1. See cases cited supra note 210.
212. See cases cited supra note 210.
213. See cases cited supra note 210.
214. Arteaga v. State, 527 N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (N.Y. 1988).
215. Id.
216. Id.; Mosher-Simons v. County of Allegany, 783 N.E.2d 509, 512-13 (N.Y.
2002); Davis v. State, 691 N.Y.S.2d 668, 671 (App. Div. 1.999).
217. Davis, 691 N.Y.S.2d at 671 (internal citations ommitted).
218. Id. (internal citations ommitted).
219. Id.
220. Tarter v. State, 503 N.E.2d 84, 86-87 (N.Y. 1986); Semkus v. State, 708
N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (App. Div. 2000).
1130
MUNICIPAL TORT LITIGATION
ject the local and state municipalities to massive liability, placing an
impossible burden on local and state government.
For example, determinations pertaining to parole and its revoca-
tion are strictly sovereign and quasi-judicial in nature and accord-
ingly, the State, in making such determinations, is absolutely
immune from tort liability.22 1 The courts have also applied the spe-
cial duty and governmental function analysis in dismissing claims
by victims of escaped prisoners, holding that the duty to safeguard
prisoners was a governmental duty owed to the public at large, not
to individuals.22
A. Special Relationship Required to Overcome
Governmental Immunity
Unless precise assurances were made to the specific individual,
there can be no liability for the State's performance of a govern-
mental function.223 In Clark, the plaintiff sued to recover for inju-
ries sustained by the decedent, which she claimed resulted from the
failure of the town police department to provide her with adequate
police protection from her estranged husband.224 In an effort to
avoid the operation of the general rule that a municipality may not
be held liable for injuries resulting from a failure to provide police
protection, the plaintiff asserted the existence of a "special rela-
tionship. ' 225 In order to establish a special relationship the plain-
tiff must prove: 1) an assumption by the municipality of an
affirmative duty to act on her behalf; 2) knowledge on the part of
the municipality's agents that inaction could lead to harm; 3) direct
contact between the parties; and 4) the plaintiff's justifiable reli-
ance on the assurances.226
In Clark, after a series of threatening events involving the plain-
tiff and her estranged husband, criminal charges were filed and a
temporary protection order was issued.227 When an officer deliv-
ered a copy of the temporary order of protection to plaintiff, the
officer assured the plaintiff that the police would "keep an eye on"
221. Tarter, 503 N.E.2d at 85; Semkus, 708 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
222. McEnaney v. State, 700 N.Y.S.2d 258, 260 (App. Div. 1999); Cossano v. State,
514 N.Y.S.2d 431, 432 (App. Div. 1987).
223. D'Avolio v. Prado, 715 N.Y.S.2d 827, 829 (App. Div. 2000).
224. Clark v. Town of Ticonderoga, 737 N.Y.S.2d 412, 413 (App. Div. 2002)
225. Id. at 413-14; Grieshaber v. City of Albany, 720 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215 (App. Div.
2001).
226. Clark, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 414; Greishaber, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 215; DAvolio, 715
N.Y.S.2d at 829.
227. Clark, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
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her. 28 Subsequently, the plaintiff's husband confronted her and
was charged with violating the terms of the temporary order of
protection, but was released on his own recognizance.229 The
plaintiff later saw her husband in the area, but she did not call the
police because she realized that the police could not do anything at
that time.230 Tragically, her husband arrived shortly thereafter and
repeatedly stabbed the plaintiff.23'
B. Justifiable Reliance Necessary for Special Relationship
Although the plaintiff in Clark was able to prove that a special
relationship existed, she was unable to prove that she had justifia-
bly relied on the town's undertaking. 32 "Providing the essential
causative link between the special duty assumed by the municipal-
ity and the alleged injury, the justifiable reliance requirement goes
to the core of the special relationship exception. 233
"The 'reliance' that is required is [more than a mere] hope or...
belief that the defendants could provide her with adequate ... po-
lice protection. ' 234 When the plaintiff's husband was released on
his own recognizance, the plaintiff was aware that he was not in
custody and that "the police were [unable] to take any [further]
action against [him] unless he further violated the order of protec-
tion or committed an independent crime.235
The governmental function doctrine is based primarily upon sep-
aration of powers principles. 236  The legislative and executive
branches of government, rather than the judiciary, have the unique
responsibility to allocate scarce public resources.237 Second-guess-
ing of the discretionary priorities set and resources allocated by the
other two branches of government is not appropriate. 238 "That the





232. Id. at 415.
233. ld.; see Greishaber v. City of Albany, 720 N.Y.S.2d 214, 216 (App. Div. 2001).
234. Clark, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 415.
235. Id.
236. See Kircher v. City of Jamestown, 543 N.E.2d 443, 445-46 (N.Y. 1999).
237. Id.; Greishaber, 720 N.Y.S.2d at 215.
238. Balsam v. Delma Eng'g Corp., 688 N.E.2d 487, 488-89 (N.E. 1997); Tarter v.
State, 503 N.E.2d 84, 86-87 (N.Y. 1986); Weiner v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 433 N.E.2d
124, 127 (N.Y. 1982).
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private actors is a tell-tale sign that the conduct is not proprietary
in nature.239
The plaintiff must demonstrate that the State, through direct
personal contact, assumed an affirmative duty to act on the injured
party's personal behalf, which was conveyed to the injured party,
and subsequently relied upon.24° The most critical element of the
special relationship is the injured party's justifiable reliance on the
government's assurances.241
VI. COMPLAINT LETTERS OR CONFLICTING EXPERT OPINIONS
REGARDING THE DECISION TO INSTALL A TRAFFIC
CONTROL DEVICE DO NOT AFFECT A MUNICIPALITY'S
QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Recently the Court of Appeals confirmed that highway planning
decisions are purely discretionary governmental functions, which
are completely protected from liability by qualified immunity.242
The court reiterated that a recommendation from a private engi-
neering firm that a traffic signal be installed at a particular location
does not create liability for a municipality.243 "Something more
than a choice between conflicting opinions of experts is required
before a governmental body may be held liable for negligently per-
forming its traffic planning function. ' 244 The court in Affleck went
further to hold that letters of complaint to a municipality regarding
the necessity of installing a traffic control device do not alter the
affect of the judgement by an authorized traffic planning
authority.245
It is well settled that a municipality has a non-delegable duty to
maintain its roadways in a reasonably safe condition.246
239. Balsam, 688 N.E.2d at 489.
240. Clark, 737 N.Y.S.2d at 414.
241. Id. at 415
242. Affleck v. Buckley, 758 N.E.2d 651, 652-54 (N.Y. 2001); McCabe v. Town of
Brookhaven, 735 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (App. Div. 2001); Quigley v. Goldfine, 714
N.Y.S.2d 733, 734 (App. Div. 2000); Schuster v. Town of Hempstead, 692 N.Y.S.2d
721, 722 (App. Div. 1999); Onorato v. City of New York, 684 N.Y.S.2d 637, 638 (App.
Div. 1999); O'Brien v. City of New York, 647 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562 (App. Div. 1996).
243. Affleck, 758 N.E.2d at 654.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 653
246. Vizzini v. State, 717 N.Y.S.2d 415, 416 (App. Div. 2000); Ciasullo v. Town of
Greenville, 712 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581 (App. Div. 2000); Ring v. State, 705 N.Y.S.2d 427,
427 (App. Div. 2000); Schuster v. Town of Hempstead, 692 N.Y.S.2d 721, 722 (App.
Div. 1999); Zecca v. State, 669 N.Y.S.2d 413, 414 (App. Div. 1998).
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It is [similarly] well [established] that a municipality is not an
insurer of the safety of its roadways. The design, construction
and maintenance of public highways is entrusted to the sound
discretion of municipal authorities and, so long as a highway
may be said to be reasonably safe for people who obey the rules
of the road, the duty imposed upon the municipality is
satisfied.247
A governmental entity may not be liable for highway planning de-
cisions unless its study of traffic conditions is "plainly inadequate
or there is no reasonable basis for its plan." '248 Additionally, "the
State is not required to undertake expensive reconstruction of
highways [merely] because the [highway] design standards have
been [amended or] upgraded since the time of the original con-
struction [of a highway]. 249
If a municipality determines that a traffic control device is neces-
sary to remedy a dangerous condition, the municipality should act
within a reasonable time frame to correct the condition.25 ° If there
is an unjustifiable delay in implementing a remedial plan by the
municipality, then the municipality may be subject to liability.251
Even assuming that the State was negligent in highway design or
maintenance, the State will not be liable for an accident unless its
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. 52
The Affleck case involved an automobile accident where plain-
tiff's decedents were struck by an oncoming car, while attempting
to make a left-hand turn into an entrance to a shopping center.253
"In addition to instituting an action against the drivers and owners
of the other cars involved in the accident, plaintiff ... administra-
tor ... sued the County ... alleging that the County negligently
failed to conduct traffic studies of the area [in question], relying
instead on a private[] . . . study. '254 The plaintiff further asserted
247. Ciasullo, 712 N.Y.S.2d at 581 (internal citations ommitted).
248. Affleck, 758 N.E.2d at 653 (internal citations ommitted); see McCabe v. Town
of Brookhaven, 735 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (App. Div. 2001); Quigley v. Goldfine, 714
N.Y.S.2d 733, 734 (App. Div. 2000); Romeo v. State, 709 N.Y.S.2d 783, 784 (App. Div.
2000); Light v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544 (App. Div. 1998).
249. Vizzini, 717 N.Y.S.2d at 417.
250. See Ring, 705 N.Y.S.2d at 428-29.
251. See id..
252. Hamilton v. State, 716 N.Y.S.2d 529, 530 (App. Div. 2000); see Ring, 705
N.Y.S.2d at 428; Dumond v. State, 689 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899 (App. Div. 1999).




that the county's decision not to install a traffic signal at the inter-
section in question was unreasonable.255
[I]n response to customer reports of difficulty exiting the park-
ing lot, [the shopping center commissioned a private engineer]
to conduct a study of traffic conditions at the intersection. Ap-
proximately nine months before the accident, the [private engi-
neer] presented the study to the County with its
recommendation that a traffic light be installed. Although the
[private engineer's] report focused primarily on the difficulties
faced by drivers attempting to exit the [shopping center's] park-
ing lot, it also analyzed traffic conditions for drivers entering the
parking lot from [the street where the accident occurred]. The
[engineer's] report indicated that, at all times of the day, condi-
tions for drivers making left-hand turns into the parking lot
were within acceptable parameters as set by the Federal High-
way Administration of the Department of Transportation.
According to [undisputed] affidavits, the County relied on the
[private] report, as well as its own [independent] studies of traf-
fic conditions at the intersection, to determine [that] a traffic
signal [at the intersection was unwarranted]. 6
The county did, however, take remedial measures to improve visi-
bility for drivers exiting the driveway and installed warning signs
for drivers approaching the driveway. 725 The court in Affleck held
that the county adequately examined the need for a traffic signal.
The court in Affleck held that neither the letters urging the
county to install a signal nor the recommendation by the private
engineer that one be installed raises an issue of fact concerning the
reasonableness of the county's determination.2 58 "[Although] the
letters may have alerted the county to a situation warranting study,
[such letters] do not substitute for, nor do they cast doubt upon,
the considered determination by a duly authorized traffic planning
authority. 259
"Something more than a mere choice between conflicting [ex-
pert] opinions is required before the State [or one of its agencies]
may be charged with a failure [of] its duty to plan highways for the
safety of the traveling public. 26° The plaintiff must show not
255. Id.
256. Id. at 653.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 653-54.
259. Id.
260. Affleck, 758 N.E.2d at 653-54; McCabe v. Town of Brookhaven, 735 N.Y.S.2d
608, 609 (App. Div. 2001); Romeo v. State, 709 N.Y.S.2d 783, 785 (App. Div. 2000)
(quoting Weiss v. Fote, 200 N.Y.S.2d 409, 415 (N.Y. 1960)); Chary v. State, 696
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merely that another option was available but also that the plan
adopted lacked a reasonable basis.26' Strong public policy consid-
erations warrant that the qualified immunity doctrine shall be ap-
plied in circumstances where a governmental body has invoked the
expertise of qualified employees.262
VII. LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTY PURSUANT TO A CONTRACT
On two separate occasions, the Court of Appeals recently ad-
dressed whether a contract can result in liability in tort to a third
party. Generally, a contractual obligation standing alone will not
give rise to tort liability to a third party. The court has recognized,
however, three distinct exceptions where a party who enters into a
contract to render services may assume a duty of care to persons
outside the contract. A party to a contract may be liable to third
persons where: (1) the contracting party creates or exacerbates a
harmful condition or launches a force or instrument of harm; (2)
the plaintiff detrimentally and reasonably relies on the continued
performance of the contracting parties' duties; or (3) the con-
tracting party completely assumes the other party's duty to main-
tain the premises safety.
263
A. Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors
In Espinal v. Melville Snow Contractors,264 "the plaintiff brought
a personal injury action against the defendant, a company that en-
tered into a snow removal contract with a property owner. '265 The
plaintiff alleged that she slipped and fell in the parking lot owned
by her employer, due to an icy condition created by negligent snow
removal by the defendant.266
Initially, the court indicated that a finding of negligence must be
based upon the breach of a duty.267 "[A] threshold question in tort
cases is whether the alleged tortfeasor owed a duty of care to the
injured party. ' '268 In Espinal, the issue was whether any duty ran
N.Y.S.2d 331, 332 (App. Div. 1999); Light v. State, 672 N.Y.S.2d 543, 544 (App. Div.
1998); Monfiston v. County of Suffolk, 670 N.Y.S.2d 53, 54 (App. Div. 1998).
261. Affleck, 758 N.E.2d at 652-53.
262. Romeo, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 785.
263. Church v. Callanan Indus., Inc., 782 N.E.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. 2002); Espinal v. Mel-
ville Snow Contractors, 773 N.E.2d 485, 488 (N.Y. 2002).
264. Espinal, 773 N.E.2d at 485.
265. Id. at 486.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 487.
268. Id.; Darby v. Compagnie Nat'l Air Fr., 753 N.E.2d 160, 162-63 (N.Y. 2001).
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from the contractor to the plaintiff, given that the snow removal
contract was with the property owner.269 "The existence and scope
of a duty is a question of law requiring courts to balance ... com-
peting public policy considerations.1 27 0
"[A] contractual obligation, standing alone, will generally not
give rise to tort liability in favor of a third party.1271 "Imposing
[tort] liability under such circumstances could render contracting
parties liable in tort to an indefinite number of potential
[plaintiffs]."272
The court in Espinal, discussed the decisions in H.R. Moch Co. v.
Rensselaer Water Co.,273 Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Re-
alty Corp.,274 and Palka v. Servicemaster Management Services
Corp.,275 which identify contractual situations involving possible
tort liability to third persons.276 In Moch:
the defendant entered into a contract with the City of Rensse-
laer to supply water to the City for various purposes, including
water at the appropriate pressure for fire hydrants. A building
caught fire and, because the defendant allegedly failed to supply
sufficient water pressure to the hydrants, the fire spread and de-
stroyed the plaintiff's warehouse. Although the contract was
valid and enforceable between the city and the defendant ... the
contract was not intended to make the defendant answerable to
anyone who might be harmed as a result of the defendant's al-
leged breach. Because the plaintiff company was not a third-
party beneficiary, it could not sue for breach of contract... [or
tort]. 'Liability would be unduly and indeed indefinitely ex-
tended by this enlargement of the zone of duty.'" 277
Ultimately, the court in Moch held that tort liability to a third per-
son may arise where the alleged wrongdoer launched a force or
instrument of harm.278
269. Espinal, 773 N.E.2d at 487.
270. Id.
271. Id. (internal citations ommitted).
272. Id. at 487 (citing H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 158 N.E. 896, 898-99
(N.Y. 1928)).
273. 158 N.E. at 896.
274. 556 N.E.2d 1093 (N.Y. 1990).
275. 634 N.E.2d 189 (N.Y. 1994).
276. Espinal, 773 N.E.2d at 487.
277. Id. (quoting Moch, 158 N.E. at 896).
278. Id. at 487-88.
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In Eaves Brooks, the court held that detrimental reliance is an-
other basis for a contractor's liability in tort to third parties.279 In
Eaves Brooks:
a commercial tenant sought to recover for property damage sus-
tained when a sprinkler system malfunctioned and flooded the
premises. The tenant sued the companies that were under con-
tract with the property owner to inspect and maintain the sprin-
kler system. For policy reasons, [the court] refused to extend
liability to encompass the defendant companies, noting that the
building owners were in a better position to insure against
loss.281
The court in Eaves Brooks held that tort liability may arise where
performance of contractual obligations has induced detrimental re-
liance on continued performance and the defendant's failure to
perform those obligations causes an injury to the plaintiff. 281
In Palka, the court considered:
whether a maintenance company under contract to provide pre-
ventive maintenance services to a hospital assumed a duty of
care to the plaintiff, a nurse who was injured when a wall-
mounted fan fell on her as she was tending to a patient. The
contract between the parties was "comprehensive and exclu-
sive" and required the maintenance company to inspect, repair
and maintain the facilities, and to train and supervise all support
service personnel. The company's obligation to the hospital was
so [comprehensive] that it entirely displaced the hospital in car-
rying out maintenance duties. 282
Accordingly, the court held that the "contracting provider owed a
duty to non-contracting individuals reasonably within the zone and
contemplation of the intended safety services, including the
plaintiff. 283
By the express terms of the contract, the snow removal company
was obligated to plow only when the snow accumulation had ended
and exceeded three inches.2 84 In addition, the company agreed
that upon landowner's request, it would spread a mixture of salt
and sand on certain areas of the property.2 5 As for snow removal,
the company contracted to plow during the late evening and early





284. Id. at 487-89.
285. Id. at 489.
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morning hours, and not until all accumulations have ceased, on a
one time plowing per snowfall basis.286
This contractual undertaking was not "comprehensive and exclu-
sive" property maintenance.28 7 The snow removal company "did
not entirely absorb [the landowner's duty] to maintain the premises
safely. Indeed, the contract stated that 'it is the responsibility of
the property manager or owner to inspect the property and decide
whether an icy condition warrants application[] of salt-
sand.... 288
Pursuant to the contract, the owner was required to communicate
any defect in performance to the contractor immediately.2 9
Although [the company] undertook to provide snow removal
services under specific circumstances, [the landlord] ... retained
its .. .duty to inspect and safely maintain the premises. [The
company] was under no obligation to monitor the weather to
see if melting and re-freezing would create an icy condition.29 °
The plaintiff in Espinal failed to allege detrimental reliance on
the company's continued performance of its contractual obliga-
tions. 291 "[A] defendant who undertakes to render services and
then negligently creates or exacerbates a dangerous condition may
be liable for any resulting injury. "292 The snow removal company,
however, simply cleared the snow as required by the contract.293
"Plaintiff's fall on the ice was not the result of [the company] hav-
ing launched a force or instrument of harm.294 By merely plowing
the snow, [the company] cannot be said to have created or exacer-
bated a dangerous condition."2 95
Because the mere plowing of snow by an outside contractor did
not rise to the level of any of the specific exceptions, the defendant











295. Id. (internal quotations ommitted).
296. Id.
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B. Church v. Callanan Industries, Inc.
In Church, an infant plaintiff received catastrophic spinal injuries
when the driver of the car, in which he was a rear passenger, fell
asleep at the wheel. The vehicle veered off the highway and into a
ditch.297 The site where the vehicle left the highway was within a
substantial resurfacing and safety-improving project, which was
completed years earlier, pursuant to an agreement between the
Thruway Authority and Callanan Industries, as the general
contractor.298
The project plans and specifications called for the removal and
replacement of existing guiderail with a longer guiderail system.299
In a related agreement, the Thruway Authority engaged a con-
struction-engineering firm (engineer) to inspect and supervise the
contractor's compliance with the plans and specifications.3 °°
"Under the ... agreement with [the contractor], the engineer's rec-
ommendation was required before final acceptance of the contrac-
tor's work. 30 1
The contractor entered into a subcontract for the installation of
the guiderail system, which incorporated the general contract by
reference.30 2 Pursuant to the subcontract, "all drawings, certifica-
tions and approvals of the Subcontractor shall be submitted for ap-
proval of the Architect or Engineer. '30 3  "In addition, [the
contractor] reserved the right to demand at any time that [subcon-
tractor] furnish evidence of its ability to fully perform the subcon-
tract in the manner and within the time specified in the
subcontract. "304
"The gravamen of the action was both the negligent failure to
complete the full [installation] of new guiderailing called for by the
general contract and... subcontract, and [the engineer's] negligent
inspection and approval of the installation, despite such non-com-
pletion. ' 30 5 The contractor and the subcontractor moved for sum-
mary judgment, arguing that, "as purely contracting parties with
respect to installation of the guiderailing, they owed no duty to the
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plaintiffs. 30 6 The plaintiff's submitted opinion evidenced that, had
the guiderailing been completed in accordance with the contracts,
the car would have been prevented from traveling down the
embankment. °7
The subcontractor "had no preexisting duty imposed by law to
install guiderailing at that point on the Thruway."3 8 "There was
no evidence in the record that the incomplete performance of [the]
contractual duty to install [ ] guiderailing ... created or increased
the risk of [the car's] divergence from the roadway beyond the risk
which existed, even before .. .any contractual undertaking. 30 9
The plaintiff did not contend that the loss of control of the car oc-
curred because the driver detrimentally relied on the continued
performance of the contractual duties when she failed to remain
awake and alert at the wheel.31 0 Finally, "tort liability for breach of
contract will not be imposed merely because there is some safety-
related aspect to the unfulfilled contractual obligation." 31' If liabil-
ity invariably follows non-performance of some safety-related as-
pect of a contract, the exception would assume the general rule
against recovery in tort, based merely upon the failure to act as
promised.312 There are limitations on the imposition of liability
based upon a defendant's assumption of its promisee's duty to safe-
guard third persons.31 3
The court in Church found that the subcontractor:
did not comprehensively contract to assume all the Thruway Au-
thority's safety-related obligations with respect to the guiderail
system. Instead, the Thruway Authority retained a separate
project engineer to provide inspection and supervision of all as-
pects of the project, including contract compliance with respect
to the stipulated length of the guiderail system.314
Conversely, the contractor "assumed significant obligations to
assure that the construction complied with the project specifica-
tions and.., in a timely fashion, thus undertaking an obligation to
inspect and oversee all aspects of the subcontractor's work." '315
306. Id. at 52.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 53.
310. Id.
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The subcontractor "had no reason to foresee the likelihood of
physical harm to third persons as a result of reasonable reliance by
the Thruway Authority on it to discover" any alleged safety de-
fects, and therefore did not assume the corresponding potential
tort liability." 6
CONCLUSION
A substantial portion of significant decisions by the Court of Ap-
peals during the past year may have a profound impact on civil
litigation, specifically with regard to municipal liability. Given the
complexity and potential impact of several of the key rulings, the
court may be required to provide further guidance and interpreta-
tion in the same areas in the coming years.
316. Id. at 55.
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